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JURISDICTION
As set forth in the Thomocks' motion to dismiss and the supporting papers,
Thomocks assert this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition for rehearing
because it was not timely filed. The Court has denied the Thomocks motion.

ARGUMENT

I:

THIS CASE IS CONTROLLED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
DECISION IN IN RE M.W.
Point II of this answer explains that this Court should not consider Father's

constitutional arguments because they were not raised below and because the factual

predicates for the arguments were not developed in the findings of fact. This Point
I explains that even if the Court addresses the constitutional arguments, the Court's
initial opinion properly applied the law to the facts of this case.
A.

M.W Determined What Was Necessary to Protect a Parent's
Constitutional Interest in Custody of his Child.

No one disagrees that a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the custody
of his child. Contrary to Father's arguments on page 3 of his brief1 however, the
Utah Supreme Court has already defined the circumstances under which that interest
may be lost, in State ex rel M.W.. 2000 UT 79, 12 P.3d 80. which affirmed in part
and reversed in part a Court of Appeals decision, 970 P.2d 284 (Ct. App. 1998).
M.W. is remarkably similar to the instant case. The case involved a custody dispute
between the the father and the maternal grandmother. The father lost custody in a
juvenile court proceeding, but later asserted that she2 was entitled to a parental
presumption in the custody dispute with the grandmother.
As in the instant case, the dispositive issue in M.W. was whether the father's
fundamental rights had been adequately protected. Although the Utah Supreme

father's brief asserts: "we could find no Utah cases in which a fit parents'
[sic] constitutionally protected fundamental right to custody of his child as
against third parties and the protection provided that right has specifically
been discussed."
2

Because of gender correction surgery, the father was female at the time of
the hearings discussed in the M.W. opinions.
2

Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals on the precise level of protection required,
both courts viewed the protection as being constitutionally required. The Court of
Appeals held that the parental presumption would be defeated by a final ruling and
findings that the parents parenting skills were deficient. The court held that rule to
be required "in light of the parent's constitutional and natural rights to custody of his
or her children." 970 P.2d at 289. The Supreme Court agreed that the loss of
custody had to be the result of "a final factual determination on the merits of an
underlying petition," and agreed with the Court of Appeals that the rule was required
by "the parent's constitutional right to custody of his or her own child." 2000 UT 79,
^118, 12P.3dat84.
The Utah Supreme Court has, therefore, and specifically addressed the
constitutional protection required before a parent may lose the "parental presumption." This Court is obligated to (and did) follow the decision the of the Utah
Supreme Court in M.W. Analysis of this Court's decision shows that, as stated by
the Court, M.W. compels the result reached by this Court's initial opinion.
B.

This Court Properly Interpreted and Applied M.W.

Father argues on page 11 of his Petition for Rehearing that the Utah Supreme
Court did not reject the Court of Appeals's holding that the parental presumption is
lost only where there has been a judicial determination of unfitness. Thornocks
submit that this Court correctly understand the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court.
3

More important than what the Supreme Court said, however, is what the court
actually did. The juvenile court determination at issue in M.W. did not find that the
father was an unfit parent. Rather, the juvenile court held, based on stipulated facts,
that there was sufficient neglect for the juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction. This
is not the same as finding the parent unfit to have custody. Based on that finding, the
juvenile court continued the existing placement of the children with their maternal
grandmother. Nothing in Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982). or any
of the cases citing it would hold that the parental presumption was rebutted by proof
of mere neglect.
As in the instant case, the initial custody determination depriving the father in
M.W. was based on a stipulation. Also as here, the stipulation in M.W. did not
specifically address the Hutchison factors. The M.W. stipulation consisted only of
admissions that one of the children had been sexually abused and the other might
have been abused by an unknown perpetrator, one of the children was afraid of the
father, there were some times when neither parent was not home when a child
returned from school, and the father (who was legally blind) had endangered the
children by requiring them to cross busy streets in an unsafe manner. 970 P.2d at
286. In other words, the only competent evidence of "unfitness" was that the father
had endangered the children while crossing the street. These admissions did not
come even close to matching the factors of no strong mutual bond, no willingness to
4

a sacrifice for the child, and a lack of sympathy for and understanding of the child as
required by Hutchison.
This Court correctly recognized that the Court of Appeals opinion in M.W.
held there must be a determination of parental fitness before the parental presumption
is lost. Davis % 9. By rejecting that holding and finding the parental presumption
rebutted in a case where the evidence could not have satisfied the Hutchison factors,
the Utah Supreme Court clearly established that a parent loses the parental
presumption when the parent loses custody by final judicial decision (as contrasted
with losing physical custody by mere agreement among the parties). There is no
requirement that that the initial custody decision be based on any determination
criticizing the fitness of parent. It is the result (losing custody by judicial decision).
not the rationale, which is important.
The Utah Supreme Court also made clear that its decision was based on a
consideration of a father's fundamental constitutional right to custody of his own
child. 2000 UT 79, ^ 18. There is, therefore, no reason for this Court to accept
Father's invitation to engage in a wide-ranging constitutional review.
C.

Public Policy Support this Court's Decision.

Sound public policy considerations support this Court's initial determination
in this case and the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in M.W. Father argues that,
just as he was permitted to initially decide that the best interest of Kory would be
5

served by Thornocks having custody. Father should now be able to change his mind
and ping-pong Kory back to living with Father. While Father might have been able
to achieve that result had there been no intervening judicial decision, decrees of the
court should not be so lightly overturned by the litigants. Father discourses at length
about his own constitutional rights, but makes no mention of the right of a child to
security and stability. Kory is not a chattel to be rejected by Father went it did not
suit his lifestyle and later reclaimed when Father felt like it. Father's constitutional
interest in custody of his child guaranteed that Father would not have lost custody
initially absent his own consent or a determination that the Hutchison factors had
been satisfied. Once Father voluntarily relinquished or otherwise lost custody,
however, that decision could not be reversed based solely on the Father's perceived
rights; rather, the rights of the child must also be considered. Just as an individual's
freedom stops at the point where it interferes with another person's rights, so Father's
interest in custody of his son must, at this point, be limited by the son's right to
remain in the stable and secure environment where Father left him years ago.
D.

This Court Did Not Hold that Father Had Implicitly Waived Constitutional Rights.

Father places undue emphasis on this Court's statement that "Father implicitly
agreed that his parental presumption had been rebutted." Davis f 10. The statement
is dictum, because the Utah Supreme Court in M.W. rejected any requirement of a

6

judicial determination of unfitness.3 It does not matter whether the Thornocks were
awarded custody because of some unfitness of Father or simply because that was
more convenient for him. The only relevant fact is that the custody award was made
in a final judicial decision.
E.

This Courfs Decision Will Not Lead to Unreasonable Results.

Father attempts to scare this Court with tales of what might happen. The claim
that this Court's opinion holds that a parent gives up the parental presumption by
consenting to a guardianship is simply preposterous. Guardianship is not custody.
Courts will have no difficulty distinguishing between the two. The same applies to
foster care. Under M.W., the parental presumption is lost only when the parent loses
"custody," not by a guardianship or foster care.
The concern that parents might lose rights by cowing to pressure from a
prosecutor or DCFS caseworker in a shelter hearing is not a function of this Court's
opinion, but rather the Supreme Court's opinion in M.W. As a practical matter, there
is little risk that individuals will lose constitutional rights because their rights are so

3

It would probably be more accurate to say that Father implicitly waived
his right to rely on the parental presumption at the time of the divorce decree,
rather than that the presumption had been implicitly rebutted. Hutchison
provides that a parent cannot be deprived of custody absent proof rebutting
the parental presumption, but it does not prohibit a parent from consenting
that a non parent have custody even when the Hutchison factors may not be
satisfied.
7

well protected by statutory procedures focused on returning the child to the parents
as soon as is possible.
II:

FATHER'S CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS WERE NOT RAISED
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.
Father did not raise any constitutional arguments before the trial court, but has

made those arguments for the first time on appeal. The appellate courts generally
should not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal because such
arguments will usually be presented without an adequate record.

Bunch v.

Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Atwood. 831 P.2d
1056, 1057 (Utah App. 1992). Such as the case here. Many of Father's arguments
are based on assertions which find no support in the record. For example. Father's
claim that he was "not notified or consulted before [Thornocks] took possession"
(Petition p. 12) of Kory is not supported by any citation to the record, and finds no
support in the evidence. The fact is that Thornocks received Kory for what was
supposed to be a short holiday visit. The claim that California authorities were
somehow involved because of supposed neglect by the mother is not supported by
the record and is inaccurate.
Father chose to present no testimony or other evidence at trial, even though
the matter being tried was his petition for modification of the custody order. Without
any solid evidentiary basis, however, he would now have this Court accept his
8

unsupported claims to find some constitutional violation.

This Court should

remember that Thornocks dispute many of the facts asserted by Father. This Court
should stick strictly to the facts found by the trial court.
To the extent there is a record, however, it supports the decision of the trial
court.
Waving the flag of his military service. Father argues that public policy and
the Constitution prohibit him from losing his "constitutional right'* to custody of his
son as a penalty for serving his country. While Father's military service may be
commendable, the record does not support blaming his loss of custody on that
service. Father was simply more interested in his girlfriend(s) than in his son. In the
Addendum to the custody evaluation, the evaluator stated:
Travis could have obtained a "hardship" discharge from
the military if he had requested one.... or reassignment
of duty to a naval bse in the continental United States.
The evaluation process reveals that Travis had a
paramour relationship(s) while assigned overseas duty
and was content to continue his military career while
Kory was cared for by Mr. and Mrs. Thornock.
Notwithstanding this clear claim that it was Father's mistress and not his
military service that kept him away from Kory, Father elected to not rebut the
evidence. This is, therefore, not the proper case in which to evaluate the effect of
military service on loss of custody.

9

The record also supports the inference that, had the trial court been required
to determine whether the parental presumption was rebutted at the point in time when
Father initially lost custody, the record would have overwhelmingly shown that each
of the Hutchison factors was satisfied.4 At that point in time. Father had not
developed a close mutual bond with his child. He did not show willingness to
sacrifice his own interest for those the child, but preferred to spend time with his
girlfriend and allow the grandparents to raise his son. Is extremely unlikely that he
had and understanding of the child consistent with parents generally, because Kory
had lived with Thornocks since he was 10 months old and saw Father only
infrequently. At the time of the custody order, Kory was four years old and had been
living with Thornocks for over three years.
Ill:

EVEN IF THE PRESUMPTION APPLIES, IT WAS REBUTTED.
Thornocks' prior brief explained that the evidence before the trial court firmly

supported the finding that the parental presumption had been rebutted. That evidence
includes most notably the trial court's interview with Kory. Because no transcript
was provided, this Court must presume that the evidence supported the findings.

4

Indeed, on page 25 of his initial brief, Father argues that the Hutchison
factors should have been analyzed as of the time of his most recent request for
custody, and criticized the court's reliance on his behavior at an earlier time.
Implicit in the argument is the admission that the parental presumption would
have been rebutted at the time of the divorce decree, when Father asked the
court to award custody to Thornocks.
10

CONCLUSION
This Court's opinion was carefully reasoned and properly applied the law
established by the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court opinion in M.W.
holds that a parent's constitutional interest in custody is protected by finding the
parental presumption rebutted only where custody has been lost by judicial decision.
That opinion compels that result reached by this Court, as this Court's opinion
recognized.
The petition for rehearing should be denied.
DATED this 2 *jay of October, 2001.
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